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Chapter 1: Introduction
As cloud services become ubiquitous, it is essential that web applications pro-
tect the privacy of their users and strengthen the security of their systems. These
web applications can be complex since they are typically maintained by multiple
developers and have large code bases. These realities make it extremely difficult to
enforce privacy and access control policies through manual inspection of the code.
One solution to this problem is to use Information Flow Control (IFC) to automat-
ically guarantee that these policies are enforced.
LIO is an existing IFC framework designed for Haskell applications [1]. This
system provides strong guarantees about confidentiality and integrity, which can
be leveraged to enforce an application’s policies. Unfortunately, LIO has some
limitations that prevent it from being used for web applications written in Haskell.
The first is that LIO only enforces IFC for the IO monad. This is insufficient since
Yesod, a web framework for Haskell, runs in a special Handler monad. Therefore,
LIO is unable to enforce IFC for Yesod applications. Another limitation is that LIO
limits monadic lifting to trusted code, which prevents regular code from performing
IO operations. This allows secure systems to be built from the ground up, but can
be too constraining for developers who wish to use existing libraries like Yesod.
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LMonad addresses these limitations by generalizing LIO. LMonad generalizes
LIO by providing a monad transformer, so that IFC can be added to any existing
computation. In addition, the developer may relax the condition that only trusted
code can perform lifting.
Objects in LMonad have a security label associated with them, where labels
have a partial ordering. LMonad enforces IFC in LIO’s style by dynamically keeping
track of two pieces of information. The first is the label of objects already read or
written by a program. The second is the clearance label which restricts what the
program is allowed to read or write. If the program ever tries to manipulate an
object with a label below the current label or above the clearance label, a security
exception occurs and the program fails safely.
LMonad integrates with Yesod by replacing functions that interact with the
database. The database functions provided by LMonad guarantee IFC policies are
enforced by inserting appropriate checks on database reads and writes. LMonad
also supports richer database queries through a DSL called LSQL. LSQL queries
can include outer joins, and they also enforce IFC policies with appropriate label
checks. Haskell’s type system statically enforces that LMonad’s database functions
are used. IFC policies are enforced dynamically by LMonad and fail gracefully when
policy violations occur. To define IFC policies, LMonad offers label annotations,
which allow the developer to define the label associated with objects stored in the
database.
A key advantage of using LMonad is that it is much easier to guarantee that
IFC policies are being enforced. In traditional applications, it is the developer’s
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job to ensure complete mediation of security-sensitive operations and to perform
the right authorization checks — any failure to do so may result in a systemwide
violation of security. The entire code base essentially becomes trusted, and it would
be arduous to audit the entire system to ensure that all the checks are correct and
satisfy IFC policies. With LMonad, the trusted computed base of an application
shrinks dramatically. Typically, auditors would only need to verify the trusted code
that sets the clearance works properly, while LMonad would guarantee that the
rest of the code adheres to the IFC policies. For example, the original codebase
of the Build it Break it Fix it web application consists of 7,077 trusted lines of
code. It is almost imposible to verify this amount of code, and a previous version of
the application had at least one security policy violation. By adding LMonad, the
trusted code base of this site shrinks to 70 lines of code. It is almost trivial to verify
that this code properly sets the clearance label.
LMonad’s abstractions can be used to simplify code that performs permission
checks. In many cases, manual access control checks can be eliminated since LMonad
automatically provides these checks. For example, the Build it Break it Fix it
website has a function, shown in Figure 1.1, that redirects unauthorized users before
displaying a team’s confidential information. This function first checks if the user
is an administrator. It then does a database query to see if the user is on the
given team. If both of these conditions are false, it redirects the user’s browser to a
permission denied page. With LMonad, this function can be removed because any
database queries that retrieve the team’s confidential information will automatically
enforce IFC policies and redirect unauthorized users. LMonad gives the developer
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redirectUnauthorizedTeam tId = do
(Entity uId u) <- requireAuth
if userAdmin u then
return ()
else do
teams <- runDB $ select $ from $
\(t ‘LeftOuterJoin ‘ tm) -> do
on (t ^. TeamId ==. tm ^. TeamMemberTeam)
where_ ( t ^. TeamId ==. val tId &&.
(t ^. TeamLeader ==. val uId
||. tm ^. TeamMemberUser ==. val uId))
limit 1
return t




Figure 1.1: Function that redirects unauthorized users from viewing a team’s confi-
dential information on the Build it Break it Fix it website. This function is unneeded
with LMonad.
this type of access control check for free, thereby reducing the developer’s workload.
Another way LMonad simplifies permission checks is that developers can ask
the floating label system whether the program has permission to take an action.
For example, Figure 1.2 shows a website without LMonad that needs to manually
perform access control checks. This process is tedious as the program first needs
to check whether the user is logged in. Then it needs to check whether the user is
viewing its own profile or if the user is an administrator. If all of these conditions
are true, then the site can display the confidential information. The details of
this are later discussed in Section 4.3, but LMonad can simplify and reduce the
code associated with this access control check. LMonad does this by looking at
the current label and clearance to determine whether to display the confidential
4
getProfileR :: UserId -> Handler Html






Just (Entity uId ’ u) ->
if uId == uId ’ || userAdmin u then
[whamlet|
<p>





Figure 1.2: A manual access control check that decides whether to display a user’s
confidential information. LMonad can simplify and reduce the code associated with
this check.
information or not.
LMonad’s implementation is split into two libraries. The core library includes
the generalization of LIO and enforces IFC for Haskell applications. The other
library integrates with Yesod by providing label annotations, IFC safe database
functions, and LSQL. The implementation of the former is 569 lines of code, while
the latter is 4,028 lines of code. Both libraries are released as open source and are
available on GitHub1.
To evaluate LMonad, we developed an example website with access control
policies designed to protect users’ private information. We also converted Build
it Break it Fix it, a large existing web application, to make use of LMonad. Our
results indicate that it is feasible to use LMonad in Yesod applications. Programmers
1https://github.com/jprider63/LMonad
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need to exert moderate effort to support LMonad, however most of the changes are
straightforward and the type checker indicates where the changes need to be made.
In terms of performance, experimental benchmarks only show a roundtrip latency
overhead of up to 4 milliseconds or 4.82%.
The main contribution of this work is LMonad, which is a generalization of
LIO that is more flexible and deployable. LMonad provides end-to-end security
by enforcing IFC across database boundaries for the web development framework
Yesod. LMonad supports a richer, policy-enforced query language, and it is par-
ticularly novel in that the query language allows outer joins. This work provides
LMonad’s implementation and an evalutation that demonstrates LMonad is effective
at enforcing security policies with minimal overhead.
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Chapter 2: Background
This chapter describes background information for this work, and previous
work I built upon. I discuss some of the features from the Haskell programming
language. Readers who are familiar with Haskell and its common abstractions may
feel free to skip this section. Yesod is like the “Rails” of Haskell, and we mention
some of its benefits. Then the chapter introduces the basics of IFC. Finally, we
highlight LIO’s floating label IFC system.
2.1 Haskell
Haskell is a lazy, functional programming language [2]. It has a strong, static
type system that catches many bugs at compile time. As such, if a program compiles,
the developer has more of an assurance that the program is correct [3].
Haskell has typeclasses, which are akin to interfaces in other languages and
traits in Rust [4]. Typeclasses allow overloading of their functions. When a devel-
oper creates a new datatype, the developer can create an instance of a typeclass.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how this would be done for the Foo data type and the Eq
typeclass. The typeclass definition of Eq is also included. This definition requires
that instances of Eq define two functions, == and /=, that implement equals and
7
class Eq a where
(==) :: a -> a -> Bool
(/=) :: a -> a -> Bool
data Foo = Foo | Fighters
instance Eq Foo where
(==) Foo Foo = True
(==) Fighters Fighters = True
(==) _ _ = False
(/=) a b = not (a == b)
Figure 2.1: Eq instance for the Foo data type.
not equals for the datatype. In the figure, type Foo has two constructors Foo and
Fighters. Foo’s instance of Eq is implemented such that two Foos are equal only if
both arguments have the same constructors.
Monads are frequently used in Haskell to chain together special computations
that can cause side effects [5]. For example, the IO monad allows programs to
perform operations like interacting with the file system, reading from standard input,
and writing to standard output. Monads can also be layered on top of one another.
The mechanism to perform this layering is called a monad transformer. Monad
transformers are important because they allows developers to combine the effects
of computations that run in different monads. To run a computation of an inner
monad in the outer monad, the programmer can simply lift the inner computation
using a monad tranformer.
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2.2 Yesod
Yesod is a web development framework for Haskell [6]. It is a very strong
framework for developing web applications for many reasons. The first is that it
has a strong type system that prevents many kinds of web-based attacks including
cross site scripting (XSS), cross site request forgery (CSRF), and SQL injection.
In addition, it provides a rich environment for web development by taking care of
routing, database queries, and session cookies. Finally, Yesod is actively developed
and has a responsive community that is willing to aid developers and fix issues.
2.3 Information Flow Control
Information Flow Control (IFC) systems restrict how information flows within
a program’s execution. Different channels are used to model the inputs and outputs
of a program with different principals. IFC systems are used to enforce confiden-
tiality models like non-interference and integrity models like confinement.
Non-inteference states that attackers cannot distinguish between the outputs
of a program when that program is given different secret inputs [7]. This guarantees
that non-interfering programs will not leak secret information. Confinement provides





Figure 2.2: The confidentiality security lattice representing classified and public
data.
class (Eq l) => Label l where
leq :: l -> l -> Bool
lub :: l -> l -> l
glb :: l -> l -> l
Figure 2.3: The Label typeclass, specifying an interface for the security lattice.
2.4 LIO
LIO is a dynamic, floating label IFC framework for Haskell [1]. In such a
system, objects have labels associated with them that indicate policy properties like
confidentiality and integrity. Labels allow the program to keep track of whether the
code executing on behalf of a principal has permission to read or write to protected
values. When a policy violation occurs, LIO halts the program’s execution and
handles the error.
Labels in LIO must create a security lattice. Security lattices can be used
to model how information is allowed to flow within a system [8]. For example,
Figure 2.2 shows a confidentiality lattice with two labels, high (H) and low (L).
These can be thought of as classified and public information, respectively, so low
information can flow to high information, but the reverse is not allowed. Labels in
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printDocument handler = do -- L0
doc <- openDocument handler -- L0 ‘join ’ LD
print doc -- L0 ‘join ’ LD
Figure 2.4: An example program with a floating label system.
LIO programs must provide the least upper bound (Join, t), greatest lower bound
(Meet, u), and flow to (v) operators to create a security lattice. Specifically, labels
must correctly implement the Label typeclass shown in Figure 2.3.
LIO is a floating label system because LIO dynamically keeps track of the
current label and clearance as the program executes. Behind the scenes, LIO stores
the current label and clearance label in a mutable tuple. Every operation performed
in a LIO computation could cause the current label to be updated. For example,
whenever a value with a label is manipulated, the current label rises to join of the
value’s label and itself. As a result, the current label monotonically increases. An
example of a program with a floating label system is shown in Figure 2.4. The
comments show what the current label is at every line in the function. The func-
tion printDocument take a handler to a document, opens it, and then prints the
document to the screen. When the document is opened, openDocument taints the
current label with the document’s label LD. Since the current label is initially L0,
the resulting current label rises to L0 t LD. From now on, the current label can only
stay at its current level or increase.
Initially, LIO programs carefully set the clearance label. If the current label
ever exceeds (or can not flow to) the clearance, then a policy violation has occurred
and execution halts. This behavior is required so that LIO programs do not leak con-
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evalLIO :: LIO l a -> LIOState l -> IO a
getLabel :: Label l => LIO l l
setLabel :: Label l => l -> LIO l ()
getClearance :: Label l => LIO l l
setClearance :: Label l => l -> LIO l ()
Figure 2.5: Highlights from LIO’s API.
fidential data. LIO formally proves this statement with a proof of non-interference.
LIO also proves confinement which guarantees the integrity of sensitive data.
Figure 2.5 highlights parts of LIO’s API. The function evalLIO runs an LIO
computation given an initial current label and clearance state. The first argument
with type LIO l a is the LIO computation that will be evaluated. The polymorphic
type l is the computation’s label type, while type a is the type returned by the
computation. The second argument with type LIOState l sets the initial current
label and clearance label. LIOState l is basically a wrapper around a tuple of two
labels of type l. The API also has getter and setter functions for the current label
and clearance. It is important to note that the label passed into the setters must
satisfy the condition, currentLabel v newLabel v clearance, in order to preserve
the security of the label system.
LIO has a special mechanism which allows the program to perform a compu-
tation without raising the current value. The restriction is that the result of the
computation cannot be directly returned. Instead, a Labeled object is returned
in place of the result. The Labeled object remembers the result and the current
label at the end of the computation. When the result is extracted from the Labeled
12
data Label l => Labeled l a
label :: Label l => l -> a -> LIO l (Labeled l a)
unlabel :: Label l => Labeled l a -> LIO l a
labelOf :: Label l => Labeled l a -> l
toLabeled :: Label l => l -> LIO l a -> LIO l (Labeled l a)
Figure 2.6: API for Labeled values.
object, the current label is tainted by the label of the computation. This allows a
program to delay tainting of the current label.
The API associated with Labeled values is found in Figure 2.6. A key feature is
that the constructor for Labeled values is not exported, so the contents of Labeled
values cannot be read or modified. label and unlabel box and unbox Labeled
values with appropriate IFC checks. labelOf retrieves the label of the boxed value.
The interesting case is toLabeled, which allows the program to perform an LIO
computation that delays raising the current label. This is safe since the result is




The goal of this work is to support IFC in Yesod, and LIO already provides
IFC for Haskell, so one might wonder why this work does not just use LIO. The
primary reason is that LIO has limited compositionality. LIO runs on top of the IO
monad, but Yesod mainly uses the Handler monad. As a result, one would have to
rewrite all of Yesod’s functionality on top of LIO.
LMonad provides a solution to the compositionality problem by creating a
monad transformer. This monad transformer can be run over any existing monadic
computation. Thus developers can utilize existing code and libraries, like Yesod,
while enforcing IFC policies.
Another reason this work does not use LIO is that LIO only provides monadic
lifting through the trusted function ioTCB. This means that only trusted code is
able to call this function; this design decision prevents regular code from perform-
ing computations in the IO monad. As a result, programs using LIO are able to
build secure systems from the ground up by selectively whitelisting code that does
not circumvent IFC checks. Unfortunately, this whitelisting approach can be too
restrictive and cumbersome for developers who wish to use existing libraries.
To address this issue, LMonad provides the option to allow more of a blacklist-
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class Monad m => LMonad m where
lFail :: m a
lAllowLift :: m Bool
data (Label l, Monad m, LMonad m) =>
LMonadT l m a = LMonadT (StateT (l, l) m a)
Figure 3.1: The LMonad typeclass, and the LMonadT transformer used to add IFC to
any monad.
ing philosophy. When the developer allows it, arbitrary computations on the inner
monad are allowed to be lifted. In this situation, the programmer is responsible for
hiding code that could potentially circumvent IFC checks. This seems reasonable
in Yesod applications since most code is imported from the Import module; the
programmer should be able to replace imports of Yesod’s database functions with
LMonad’s in a single location. Developers could also use automated tools to ensure
that blacklisted code is not used. For instance, a simple script could use grep to
detect when modules that go around IFC safety checks are imported.
3.1 Design and Implementation
Here we highlight some of the design and implementation of LMonad. LMonad
itself is a generalization of LIO as it works for any monad that implements its type-
class, not just IO. Figure 3.1 shows this typeclass. lFail defines what to do when a
policy violation occurs. lAllowLift tells LMonad whether it should allow arbitrary
functions to be lifted, thereby making them available in LMonad computations. This
function is how the programmer can choose either the whitelisting or blacklisting
approach.
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instance LMonad IO where
lFail = exitFailure
lAllowLift = return False
type LIO l a = LMonadT l IO a
Figure 3.2: LIO implemented in LMonad.
LMonad offers the transformer LMonadT to add IFC onto any monad. Its
definition can be seen in Figure 3.1. The datatype LMonadT has type parameters l,
m, and a. These types respectively correspond to the computation’s label, the inner
monad, and the computation’s return type. The label type must be an instance
of the Label typeclass, and the inner monad must be instances of the Monad and
LMonad typeclasses. The LMonadT constructor is a wrapper around a state monad
transformer (StateT), which keeps track of the current label and clearance label.
LMonadT’s constructor is not exported so untrusted code cannot modify the current
label and clearance label.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates how LIO can be implemented in LMonad, which
shows that LMonad is a generalization of LIO. Specifically, IO is made an instance
of LMonad where lifting is not allowed. Then LIO is defined as a type alias of
LMonadT with the inner monad set to IO.
LMonad’s API is very similar to LIO’s, but there are a few differences that
make LMonad easier to use. These changes still preserve the security properties
demonstrated by LIO. As seen in Figure 3.3, the Label typeclass now requires
instances to implement bottom (⊥) from the security lattice. This is now required
due to a change in runLMonad. This change is a design choice that initially sets
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class (Eq l) => Label l where
leq :: l -> l -> Bool
lub :: l -> l -> l
glb :: l -> l -> l
bottom :: l
runLMonad :: (Label l, LMonad m) =>
LMonadT l m a -> m a
raiseClearanceTCB :: (Label l, LMonad m) =>
l -> LMonadT l m ()
toLabeled TCB :: (Label l, LMonad m) =>
l -> LMonadT l m a -> LMonadT l m (Labeled l a)
Figure 3.3: Differences in LMonad’s API.
main = runLMonad $ do -- bottom
handler <- getHandler "doc.txt" -- bottom
printDocument handler -- bottom ‘join ’ LD
Figure 3.4: An example LMonad program that opens and prints a document. The
current label is shown in the comments, and runLMonad initially sets the current
label to bottom.
both the current label and clearance to bottom. Figure 3.4 shows an example of
how to use runLMonad in an application to track IFC. The comments show the
current label after every statement. Unlike LIO, this application does not need to
explicitly specify an initial current label and clearance since runLMonad sets them
both to bottom.
To set the clearance label, the trusted function raiseClearanceTCB is now
provided. This function will lift the clearance to the join of the old clearance and the
given label. This function is convenient when developers need to assign clearances
multiple times, like when there are multiple types of principals. An example of
how to use raiseClearanceTCB to set the clearance is found in Figure 3.5. The
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setUserClearance = do -- C0
user <- getCurrentUser -- C0
raiseClearanceTCB
(UserLabel user) -- C0 ‘join ’ (UserLabel user)
Figure 3.5: An example trusted function which sets the clearance based on the
current user. The clearance label is shown after every statement.
comments show the clearance label after every statement, and the initial clearance
is C0. The trusted function setUserClearance sets the clearance label by calling
raiseClearanceTCB with the current user’s label. The resulting clearance is the
join of the initial clearance and the current user’s label.
toLabeledTCB is now a trusted function as it raises the clearance while com-
puting Labeled values. Since we potentially allow lifting, the underlying monad
could leak information to an external source. All trusted functions are in a separate
module though, so trusted code must import this module explicitly. toLabeledTCB
is used extensively by LMonad’s database functions to delay reading results from
the database and tainting the current label.
For convenience, LMonad implements two labeling systems. The first is called
PSLabel and is the powerset of all principals. Another is DCLabel, which LIO also
provides. Disjunction category labels were introduced by Stefan et al. [9]. They are
represented as boolean formulas of principals in conjunctive normal form. In other
words, they are ands of ors of principals. The security lattice is implemented for
both of these labels. Now developers can use these labels in their LMonad programs
by defining an appropriate principal datatype. An example of this is later shown in
Figure 4.3.
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Chapter 4: Integrating LMonad with Yesod
The high level goals of integrating LMonad with Yesod are to provide a simple
mechanism to define IFC policies and to ensure that all database interactions respect
these policies. Yesod has an existing DSL to define database models. IFC policies
should be defined by making label annotations to the field definitions in this DSL.
Database functionality provided by LMonad should also automatically insert IFC
checks. This chapter details how these goals are accomplished.
4.1 Integrating an example website
Our efforts to integrate LMonad with Yesod are guided by a simple example
website where users can create accounts, log in, view profiles, and update personal
getProfileR :: UserId -> Handler Html
getProfileR uId = do




Username: #{ userIdent user}
<p>
Email: #{ userEmail user}
|]
Figure 4.1: An example website that violates policy.
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import Yesod as Import hiding (
...




maybeAuthId , -- authentication functions
requireAuthId
)
Figure 4.2: Hiding functions that could circumvent IFC checks.
information. In this example website, we want to enforce a policy where users
can only read or modify their personal information (like their email address) and
administrators can read, but not modify, anyones private information. Figure 4.1
depicts a simple webpage that violates this policy. This webpage takes a user’s
identifier as an argument, which Yesod provides by parsing the URL. It then does
a database query to retrieve the user entity that corresponds to the given identifier.
Finally, it generates HTML that displays the user’s username and email address.
This webpage violates the policy because it never checks whether the user is logged
in before displaying the user’s email address on the page. Any public visitor to the
website will see the email address, which is a clear violation of the privacy policy.
Integrating LMonad with Yesod can prevent this policy violation.
The first step to integrating LMonad in the application is to blacklist all func-
tions that could circumvent IFC checks. This is simple to do in the Yesod application
by hiding all the database functions from the Import module. This is demonstrated
in Figure 4.2. Authentication functions are also hidden as a matter of convenience,





type MyLabel = DCLabel Principal
Figure 4.3: Defining labels as DCLabels where principals are users and administra-
tors.
The next step is to define an appropriate label to enforce the policy. For the
example website, we use the DCLabels to keep track of confidentiality and integrity.
Here, principals are administrators and all the users, as seen in Figure 4.3.
After choosing a labeling system, functionality should be added to set the
clearance label when a user is logged into the site. It can be convient to add this func-
tionality to the authentication functions since the authentication functions should
already be used where privileged tasks occur. If setting the clearance is provided by
another function, calls to this function would have to be added throughout the appli-
cation’s code, resulting in significantly more work for the developer. An example of
these definitions are shown in Figure 4.4. The trusted function, raiseUserLabel’,
creates a label corresponding to the given user. It also joins in the administrator
label if the user is an adminstrator. Finally, it raises the clearance level to that
of the computed label. Note that this function is not exported by the module for
external use.
Entities are the Haskell data types that represent tables from the database,
similar to an object relational mapping (ORM). For example, there is a User entity
that is a record with fields for the user’s username, password, and email address.




user <- lLift Auth.requireAuth
raiseUserLabel ’ user
return user
raiseUserLabel ’ (Entity userId user) =
let label ’ = dcSingleton $ PrincipalUser userId in
let label = if userAdmin user then





Figure 4.4: The redefined authentication functions now also raise the clearance label
when a user is logged in.
on reads, writes, and creations for every database entity. This is done by creating
instances of the typeclass LEntity, which is displayed in Figure 4.5. The figure
also shows an example instance implementation for the User table. Since either an
administrator or the owner can read the user’s data, the meet of the admin and
user’s confidentiality labels is returned. Similar functionality is implemented for
writes and creations.
The final step in integration is to replace all database functions with ones pro-
vided by LMonad’s Yesod library. We have already hidden Yesod’s database func-
tions, so we can easily replace them by exporting Database.LPersist in the Import
module. These database function names are overloaded with Yesod’s database func-
tions so no more code changes are necessary. The provided database functions call
the previously defined LEntity functions so that the current label rises on database
reads, writes, and creations. An example of one of these library functions is shown
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class Label l => LEntity l e where
getLabelRead :: Entity e -> l
getLabelWrite :: Entity e -> l
getLabelCreate :: e -> l
instance LEntity MyLabel User where
getLabelRead (Entity id user) = glb
(dcConfidentialityLabel PrincipalAdmin)
(dcConfidentialityLabel $ PrincipalUser id)
getLabelWrite (Entity id user) = dcIntegrityLabel $
PrincipalUser id
getLabelCreate user = bottom
Figure 4.5: The LEntity typeclass which defines how to raise the current label on
database interactions for an entity, and an instance of the LEntity typeclass for the
User table.
import Database.LPersist as Import
Figure 4.6: Export of Database.LPersist to use LMonad’s library functions that
check IFC policies.
in Figure 4.7. The get function retrieves a result from the database and raises the
current label when a result is returned.
Once integration is complete, we can see how to fix the policy violation from
the original example in Figure 4.1 by using LMonad. Figure 4.8 shows the fixes.
Specifically, the developer must indicate that the computation should run in LMonad
by calling runLMonad; a call is made to raiseUserLabel to raise the logged in user’s
get key = do
res <- Persist.get key
whenJust res $ lift .
taintLabel . getLabelRead . (Entity key)
return res
Figure 4.7: The replaced get function that now correctly raises the label by calling
getLabelRead and taintLabel.
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getProfileR :: UserId -> Handler Html
getProfileR uId = runLMonad $ do
raiseUserLabel





Username: #{ userIdent user}
<p>
Email: #{ userEmail user}
|]
Figure 4.8: The fixed profile page example that no longer has a policy violation.
clearance; the redefined runDB and get are called which redirects the client’s browser
to an error page if the user does not have permission to view the entity returned by
the database.
4.2 Simplifying Integration
At first glance, it appears as though it is a lot of work for developers to integrate
LMonad with a Yesod application. Even worse is the fact that the developer could
make a mistake during integration and fail to enforce an IFC policy. Ideally, the
developer would only need to integrate a small, trusted amount of code, which
could be easily verified. Fortunately, LMonad solves this problem because a lot of
the integration can be automated. The library will generate code that enforces the
IFC policies correctly. This leaves the developer to make cosmetic changes and focus
on the small trusted computing base.
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C = ‘<’ L ‘,’ L ‘,’ L ‘>’
L = K | ‘_’
K = A ‘||’ K | A
A = ‘Id ’ | ‘Const ’ name | ‘Field ’ name
Figure 4.9: Grammar for label annotations used to define IFC policies. Each slot
corresponds to the permissions required to read, write, and create a field, respec-




email Text < Const Admin || Id, Id , _ >
admin Bool
Figure 4.10: An example of the modified DSL to specify IFC policies for the email
field.
4.2.1 Label Annotations
Programmers can define IFC policies by manually creating LEntity instances
for each table (or entity) in their database models. This presents an implemen-
tation burden to developers, and there is no assurance that they are accurately
implementing the policies. LMonad addresses this with label annotations, which
are a straightforward means to define IFC policies.
Yesod already provides a model DSL to define database schemas and each
table’s corresponding Haskell data type (called entities). LMonad modifies this DSL
so that IFC policies can be defined in a simple manner. After each field definition
in a database entity, the developer has the option of including a label annotation to
indicate how the current label should rise on database reads, writes, and creations.
Keywords are used to indicate different policy dependencies. Id means the current
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label should be tainted by the current entity’s identifier. Const means the current
label should be tainted by a constant label. Field means the current label should be
tainted by another field of a given name in that entity. An underscore, , means that
the current label should not change for the given action. Multiple label annotations
can be combined with ||, which means that either label has permission to do a
specificied action. The grammar used to annotate labels is shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.10 shows an example of how the developer can take advantage of the
modified DSL to define IFC policies. After the email field’s definition, optional
angled brackets indicate a label annotation. Each slot corresponds to required per-
missions on read, write, and creation of the email field. This example policy states
that the user must be an administrator or owner to read the email field. Users
can only modify their own email addresses, and anyone can write to the email field
while creating a new entity.
LMonad implements the IFC policies by automatically generating code that
taints the current label for each field in the entity and creates a LEntity instance
for the entity. This is done through the use of Template Haskell which manipulates
the AST during compilation. This automates the process of writing the integration
code previously seen in Figure 4.5.
To use label annotations, the developer only needs to define a mapping from
a principal’s type to its label. This can be done by creating an instance of ToLabel
for each principal type. This is straightforward and is demonstrated in Figure 4.11.
The mapping for Const labels is given by String instances.
Through the use of label annotations, developers can easily define IFC policies
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class ToLabel t l where
toConfidentialityLabel :: t -> l
toIntegrityLabel :: t -> l
instance ToLabel (Key User) MyLabel where
toConfidentialityLabel uId = dcConfidentialitySingleton $
PrincipalUser uId
toIntegrityLabel uId = dcIntegritySingleton $
PrincipalUser uId
instance ToLabel String MyLabel where
toConfidentialityLabel "Admin" =
dcConfidentialitySingleton PrincipalAdmin
toConfidentialityLabel _ = error "ToLabel: Invalid string"
toIntegrityLabel "Admin" =
dcIntegritySingleton PrincipalAdmin
toIntegrityLabel _ = error "ToLabel: Invalid string"
Figure 4.11: The ToLabel typeclass creates a mapping from principals to labels.
Instances of this typeclass are also shown for the user and administrator principals.
on their database models. These policies should be straighforward to understand,
and the programmer can now have confidence that the policies are implemented
correctly.
As a side note, the only restriction on label annotations is that Id cannot
appear in the creation annotation. When the entity is being created, its identifier
does not exist yet so you cannot have policies that depend on the identifier.
4.3 Protected Entities
The LEntity typeclass successfully enforces IFC policies, but it can be too
conservative in certain cases. For example, consider a modification of the profile
page that only shows public information to other users (Figure 4.12). The page will
always redirect to the permission denied page if the user is not logged in as the user
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getProfileR :: UserId -> Handler Html
getProfileR uId = runLMonad $ do
authId <- maybeAuthId
user <- runDB $ get uId
let dispEmail = if (Just uId) == authId then
[whamlet|
<p>








Username: #{ userIdent user}
^{ dispEmail}
|]
Figure 4.12: get is too eager in enforcing IFC so this page will always dispay a
permission denied error for the public.
whose profile is being viewed. This happens since the call to get taints the current
label by the join of all the fields in the returned entity. This is too conservative
because the user’s identity is public and anyone should be able to read it, but there
is no way for them to read the identity. In this case, get is too eager to taint the
email field’s label, even though the program does not read that field for public
users.
The solution to this problem is to introduce protected entities. Protected
entities are a class of datatypes that allow a program to delay tainting the current
label. They are similar to regular entities, but any field with an IFC policy is boxed
into a Labeled value. Now the current label will only rise when Labeled fields are
unboxed.
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data ProtectedUser = ProtectedUser {
pUserIdent :: Text
, pUserPassword :: Text
, pUserEmail :: Labeled MyLabel Text
}
class ProtectedEntity e p | e -> p where
toProtected :: LMonad m => Entity e -> LMonadT l m p
Figure 4.13: The protected entity version of User, and the ProtectedEntity type-
class that ProtectedUser must create an instance of.
In order to easily ensure that the security of IFC policies are maintained, each
entity needs a corresponding protected entity data type. For example, Figure 4.13
shows the protected entity version of User. Protected entities must also be instances
of the typeclass ProtectedEntity which maps each entity to its corresponding
protected entity. These instances typically will make use of toLabeledTCB to box
protected fields. To utilize protected entities, LMonad provides modified database
functions, like pGet (Figure 4.14), to retrieve the protected entities. This is possible
because the library functions can convert database results into protected entities by
calling functions provided by the ProtectedEntity typeclass.
LMonad can autogenerate the code that defines protected entities and their
ProtectedEntity instances by using Template Haskell and label annotations. Once
again, developers do not need to manually define new data types and label checks.
They can be confident that security policies are correctly enforced by the generated
code.
With protected entities, we can fix the profile webpage example so that anyone
can read the user’s identity. The fixed version is found in Figure 4.15. As one can
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pGet key = do
res <- lLift $ Persist.runDB $ Persist.get key
maybe (return Nothing) handler res
where
handler val = do
protected <- toProtected $ Entity key val
return $ Just protected
Figure 4.14: The pGet function to get the protected version of an entity from the
database.
see, we now use pGet to retrieve the protected user entity. A nice feature of protected
entities is that they enable the use of the floating label system itself to check whether
the clearance gives us permission to unbox protected fields. An example of this can
be seen in the protected profile page, where we use canUnlabel to determine whether
to unbox and display the email address.
4.4 Expressive Database Queries
Many real world web applications need more expressive database queries than
the simple ones we have seen so far. Haskell already has a nice library, called
Esqueleto, which allows developers to perform richer queries in a type safe manner.
For LMonad to be feasible for real world applications, these kinds of queries need to
make IFC checks as well. This is problematic, though, because there can be many
of these queries spread throughout a Yesod application. Each of these queries would
need to be audited to make sure that they make the proper IFC checks. This would
need to be redone everytime a policy changes as well. Furthermore, it is not always
obvious how to uphold the IFC policies for complex database queries.
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getProfileR :: UserId -> Handler Html
getProfileR uId = runLMonad $ do
raiseUserLabel
user <- runDB $ pGet uId
canReadEmail <- canUnlabel $ pUserEmail user
dispEmail <- if canReadEmail then do











Username: #{ userIdent user}
^{ dispEmail}
|]
Figure 4.15: The fixed version of the profile page making use of protected entities.
LMonad solves this problem by providing another DSL called LSQL, which is
a subset of SQL. The grammar for LSQL is found in Figure 4.16. Developers can use
LSQL to make more expressive SQL queries in a safe manner. A few notable features
that it enables are inner joins, outer joins, conditionals, ordering, limits, offsets, and
antiquotation of Haskell expressions. Under the hood, LSQL uses Esqueleto, which
is a Haskell library that provides type safe SQL queries.
To ensure that all the IFC policies are enforced, the generation code extracts all
of the TERMs in the LSQL statement. For all of the TERMs found, their label’s depen-
dencies are included in the requested fields of the select statement. The LSQL state-
ment is converted into Esqueleto code, so the SQL queries generated are still type
checked and protected against injection attacks. LMonad also generates IFC policy
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STMT = CMD | CMD ‘;’
CMD = SELECT TERMS ‘FROM ’ TABLES WHERE ORDERBY LIMIT OFFSET
SELECT = ‘SELECT ’ | ‘PSELECT ’
TABLES = table | TABLES JOIN table ‘ON ’ BEXPR
JOIN = ‘INNER JOIN ’ | ‘OUTER JOIN ’ | ‘LEFT OUTER JOIN ’
| ‘RIGHT OUTER JOIN ’ | ‘FULL OUTER JOIN ’
BEXPR = ‘(’ BEXPR ‘)’ | ‘NOT ’ BEXPR | TERM ‘IS NULL ’
| TERM ‘IS NOT NULL ’ | B BBINOP B | BEXPR BEBINOP BEXPR
BEBINOP = ‘AND ’ | ‘OR ’
BBINOP = ‘==’ | ‘>=’ | ‘>’ | ‘<=’ | ‘<’
B = ‘#{’ antiquote ‘}’ | CONST | TERM
CONST = ‘TRUE ’ | ‘FALSE ’ | int | double | ‘\’’ string ‘\’’
TERMS = ‘*’ | TERMSS
TERMSS = TERM | TERM ‘,’ TERMSS
TERM = table ‘.’ FIELD | FIELD
FIELD = ‘*’ | field
WHERE = ‘WHERE ’ BEXPR | NULL
LIMIT = ‘LIMIT ’ nat | NULL
OFFSET = ‘OFFSET ’ nat | NULL
ORDERBY = ‘ORDER BY’ ORDER
ORDER = TERM | TERM ‘ASC ’ | TERM ‘DESC ’ | TERM ‘,’ ORDER
Figure 4.16: The LSQL grammar used for expressive SQL queries. This language
is used to perform IFC safe queries to the database. Some notable features are
the ability to use outer joins and the use of antiquotation to include the results of
Haskell expressions in queries.
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checks for all of the TERMs previously found in the LSQL statement. If PSELECT was
given, LMonad will wrap the values returned by the database into Labeled values.
To demonstrate how LSQL works, Figure 4.17 shows a LSQL statement from
the Build it Break it Fix it web application. Tables User and UserInformation
contain private information about contestants so the current label needs to be
tainted with the labels of results from the database. The figure also shows the
code generated from the LSQL statement. This code first runs the corresponding
Esqueleto database query. Then it maps over every row returned by the query,
calling raiseLabelRead to taint the label for every result. Figure 4.18 provides an-
other example and shows the corresponding generated code. This LSQL statement
protects the judges’ email addresses.
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-- LSQL
select User.*, UserInformation .* from User
left outer join UserInformation
on User.id == UserInformation.user
where User.id == #{uId}
limit 1
-- Generate code
res_0 <- select $ from $
\( LeftOuterJoin _user _userinformation) -> do
on (just (_user ^. UserId) ==.
_userinformation ?. UserInformationUser)
where_ (_user ^. UserId ==. val uId)
limit 1
return (_user , _userinformation)







Figure 4.17: LSQL statement from the Build it Break it Fix it website, and the code
that is automatically generated. A lot is going on here, but the main takeaway is
that the appropriate IFC checks are made on all the results returned by the database
through the calls to raiseLabelRead.
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-- LSQL
select User.email from User inner join Judge
on User.id == Judge.judge
where Judge.contest == #{cId}
-- Generated code
res_0 <- select $ from $ \( InnerJoin _user _judge) -> do
on (_user ^. UserId ==. _judge ^. JudgeJudge)
where_ (_judge ^. JudgeContest ==. val cId)
return (_judge ^. JudgeContest , _judge ^. JudgeJudge ,
_user ^. UserId , _user ^. UserEmail)
lift $ mapM (\( _judge_contest , _judge_judge ,
_user_id , _user_email) -> do
taintLabel (readLabelUserEmail ’ _user_id)
return (_user_email)
) res_0
Figure 4.18: LSQL statement retrieving judges’ emails and the corresponding gen-




I developed two web applications to evaluate the integration of LMonad into
Yesod. The first is the example website that is referenced throughout the previous
chapter. The other is the Build it Break it Fix it website. Each web application has a
LMonad implementation and a vanilla implementation that does not automatically
provide IFC checks.
Two methods are used to evaluate LMonad’s integration. The first is an
approximation of developer effort in integrating LMonad. The measure we use
to estimate this is the number of lines of code changed in handler functions that
respond to web requests. This measure does not include integration changes that
are automatically provided by LMonad’s DSL and library functions.
The second method used is a measure of the performance difference between
the vanilla and LMonad implementations of the web applications. We measure
average roundtrip latency times in seconds over 1,000 trials for key page handlers.
We also compute the standard deviation for these results and the overhead of the
LMonad versus vanilla implementations. Most of the requests were simple GET
requests that retrieve content. There are a few POST requests that update state in
the web application. All requests were measured using a bash script that utilized
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Handler LOC Changed Total LOC in File
/home 2 30
/profile 6 37
/protected profile 19 49
/register 8 51
/update email 13 47
Table 5.1: The number of LOC changed in handler files while integrating LMonad
into the example Yesod application.
Handler Verb Vanilla Latency LMonad Latency Overhead
Mean (s) SD (s) Mean (s) SD (s)
/home GET 0.0488 0.0015 0.0483 0.0009 -1.02%
/register GET 0.0481 0.0007 0.0483 0.0013 0.42%
/profile GET 0.0487 0.0013 0.0485 0.0009 0.41%
/protected profile GET 0.0489 0.0014 0.0490 0.0014 0.20%
/update email GET 0.0489 0.0014 0.0484 0.0011 -1.02%
/update email POST 0.0556 0.0020 0.0557 0.0095 0.18%
Table 5.2: Experimental results comparing latency times between the example web-
site with and without LMonad. The average and standard deviation of latency times
in seconds for 1,000 trials are shown.
the unix time application. curl was used to send the HTTP requests. Cookies
and CSRF tokens were explicitly defined so that a user was logged into the site,
and the user had sufficient permissions for all of the handlers. The server used
for benchmarks was running Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server 6.5 with 24 2.2 GHz
CPUs and 32 GB of RAM. All measurements were performed locally to eliminate
network effects. PostgreSQL 9.3.5 was also run locally as the database backend.
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5.1 Example Website
As a reminder, the example website has a policy that only administrators
and users can read their email addresses. Also, users can only edit their own email
addresses. Table 5.1 shows the numbers of lines of code changed to support LMonad
for various handlers. Experimental results measuring latency for the vanilla and
the LMonad example sites are found in Table 5.2. This experiment was set up as
described in the previous section. The handlers investigated correspond to various
pages on the site like the home page, the registration page, and the profile page.
The latency measurements also benchmark the time taken to update the user’s email
address via the POST request.
5.2 Build it Break it Fix it Web Application
The Build it Break it Fix it web application is used to help run a secure pro-
gramming contest. The website allows contestants to provide personal demographic
information, receive contest announcements, view scores, and examine their submis-
sions. It is a relatively large application with 7,077 lines of code and 80 modules.
When adding LMonad to the site, there were various policies that needed to
be enforced. The first is similar to the example website where only users can read or
modify their personal information. The exception to this is that administrators can
read this information. A similar policy is enforced for defining which git repository is
used to make contest submissions for teams. Another policy is that while announce-
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postAddAnnouncementR :: Handler Html
postAddAnnouncementR = do
((res , widget), enctype) <- runFormPost postForm
case res of
...
FormSuccess (FormData title contest markdown draft) -> do
addAnnouncement title contest draft markdown
redirect AdminAnnouncementsR
Figure 5.1: Security violation that allows anyone to post announcements on the
contest website. LMonad prevents this type of IFC violation.
ments are public to read, only administrators can modify or create announcements.
One limitation encountered during integration was that four modules use aliasing,
which is currently not supported in LSQL statements. As a result, these modules
import blacklisted libraries and check IFC manually.
Adding IFC actually does prevent security violations from occuring in the
contest website. For example, one bug that previously existed in the code was
a missing check to make sure a user was an administrator before posting a new
announcement. This allowed anyone to make contest announcements! The offending
code of this example is shown in Figure 5.1. This function parses POST data and
then adds a new announcement via addAnnouncement upon success. The user is
never authenticated, so anyone can post new announcements and potentially deface
the website. In the converted version of the website, LMonad prevents this and
similar bugs with its IFC checks. When addAnnouncement makes the database call
to insert a new post, the insertion will fail and redirect to a permission denied page.
According to git, 1,149 insertions were made to enable LMonad in the contest
site, with 524 of those insertions occuring in handler code. Table 5.3 displays the
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Table 5.3: The number of LOC changed while integrating LMonad into the Build
it Break it Fix it application.
Handler Verb Vanilla Latency LMonad Latency Overhead
Mean (s) SD (s) Mean (s) SD (s)
/announcements GET 0.0577 0.0025 0.0584 0.0023 1.21%
/announcement/update POST 0.0543 0.0014 0.0551 0.0020 1.47%
/profile GET 0.0523 0.0017 0.0528 0.0018 0.96%
/buildsubmissions GET 0.0677 0.0024 0.0694 0.0025 2.51%
/buildsubmission GET 0.0706 0.0020 0.0740 0.0020 4.82%
/breaksubmissions GET 0.0633 0.0022 0.0650 0.0022 2.69%
/breaksubmission GET 0.0584 0.0014 0.0608 0.0017 4.11%
Table 5.4: Mean and standard deviation of latency in seconds of 1,000 trials for the




getParticipationBreakSubmissionsR tcId = runLMonad $
Participation.layout Participation.BreakSubmissions tcId $ do
submissions <- handlerToWidget $ runDB $ [lsql|
select BreakSubmission .*, Team.name from BreakSubmission
inner join TeamContest on
BreakSubmission.targetTeam == TeamContest.id
inner join Team on TeamContest.team == Team.id
where BreakSubmission.team == #{tcId}





let row (Entity sId s, Value target) = do
...







Figure 5.2: Excerpt of changes made to the break submission page to support
LMonad. Changes are in orange and deletions are in red.
number of changed lines of code for select handlers. Note that the code for the
buildsubmissions and buildsubmission pages is in the same file; here LOC changed
is split according to which page was modified. The same is true for the breaksub-
missions and breaksubmission pages. Figure 5.2 demonstrates some of the changes
made to support LMonad on the break submissions page. Adding runLMonad runs
the computation in the LMonadT transformer to track IFC. A previous Esqueleto
expression is converted to use the LSQL DSL. The rest of the changes are small
type fixes that need to be made due to the conversion.
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Table 5.4 compares the latency of both versions of the site. The handlers
benchmarked correspond to displaying the announcements, updating an announce-
ment, retrieving the user’s profile with personal information, getting the list of a
team’s submissions, and viewing the results of a specific submission. The same
experimental setup was used as before.
5.3 Analysis
The total number of lines that have changed indicate that it is not trivial to
integrate LMonad since every handler needs modification. This is mainly because
computation is run in a different monad so certain functions need to be lifted. Also,
Esqueleto database queries need to be rewritten in LSQL. That being said, most
modules required relatively few changes compared to their overall size. The type
checker also guides the programmer to where changes need to be made. Therefore,
we conclude that it is feasible for a developer to properly intregrate LMonad into a
Yesod application with moderate effort.
Most of the handlers show little to no overhead between the vanilla and
LMonad versions of the website. In fact, the greatest latency occurs in the buildsubmission
handler, and that is only 4 milliseconds of slowdown. This is only an overhead of
4.82%. These results indicate that LMonad incurs a negligible performance hit.
While LMonad’s overhead is small, it still exists. This overhead most likely
comes from the IFC checks that LMonad makes for every result returned by the
database. This hypothesis implies that overhead increases with more results re-
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turned by the database. The benchmark data from the Build it Break it Fix it web
application seems to support this theory. For example, the buildsubmission handler,
which has the largest overhead, returns 30 results from the database in the bench-
mark. On the other hand, the profile page has the lowest overhead and only returns
two database results. It is possible that other factors could also affect performance.
For instance, certain database operations, like writing to existing rows, could incur
greater overhead. This seems possible given the benchmark results because updat-
ing an existing announcement has 1.47% overhead, despite the fact that this handler
only makes four reads and one write.
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Chapter 6: Related Work
This work directly builds upon LIO [1], DCLabels [9], Yesod [6], and security
lattices [8], which have previously been discussed.
There are many works that attempt to control how information flows within
a program. Sabelfeld and Myers present a comprehensive survey paper in this
area [10]. This work distinguishes between various ways that secure information
can leak out of a program. It also discusses different mitigation techniques like a
program counter based static type system.
JIF by Myers provides IFC for Java programs using a static type system [11].
Pottier and Simonet present Flow Caml,which is similar to JIF except it is designed
for ML [12]. Flow Caml also uses a static type system, and information flow can be
infered since type inference for ML is decidable.
Other lines of work are more similar to LMonad since they attempt to track
information flow accross database boundaries. Schoepe et al. offer SeLINQ to
accomplish this. They use a DSL in a language like F# to express database queries.
A main distinction between LMonad and their work is that SeLINQ uses a static
type system. SeLINQ’s quatation language is also less expressive since it does not
support outer joins.
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SELinks is a programming language by Corcoran et al. designed to build
secure web applications that interact with databases [13]. An interesting feature
of SELinks is that policy enforcement is moved to the PostgreSQL database server
when possible to improve performance. The language also uses dependent types to
make sure IFC policies are checked. Again, SELinks statically enforces IFC which
differs from LMonad’s dynamic floating label system. LMonad also provides richer
database queries through the LSQL DSL.
Chlipala’s UrFlow provides a unique method for implementing information
flow policies [14]. UrFlow statically checks policies for Ur/Web applications using
symbolic execution and automated theorem proving. While it is convenient that
UrFlow checks policies statically, UrFlow applications can take a much longer time
to compile than LMonad applications.
Fabric by Liu et al. is a language and decentralized system to enforce IFC [15].
Fabric is different from LMonad and previously mentioned works since it no longer
focuses on the interaction between a web application and its database. Instead,
Fabric provides guarantees about how information is distributed amongst nodes in
a network.
There are various labeling schemes that can be use to track information flow.
Montagu et al. survey various information flow labels [16]. This work compares
different labels in terms of their expressivenes. The authors develop a theoretical
abstraction called label algebras to perform this comparison. Developers should use
this work to help decide which label system to use with their LMonad applications.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This work has presented LMonad, a generalization of LIO that supports IFC
for arbitrary monads. It provides additional functionality to integrate LMonad with
web applications written in Yesod. In particular, a DSL for label annotations is
given to specify IFC policies. LSQL and LMonad’s library functions also enforce
IFC when interacting with a backend’s database by automatically inserting policy
checks.
Integrating LMonad with Yesod applications is feasible since the provided
functionality and the DSL reduce the developer’s work to a reasonable effort. Fur-
thermore, the runtime performance of the integrated version of the website is com-
parable to vanilla implemenations.
LMonad is currently limited by the fact that LSQL does not support aliases in
queries. In future work, the author plans to address this issue by adding aliases to
LSQL. In addition, the author aims to formally prove that LMonad’s interactions
with databases satisfy IFC models.
46
Bibliography
[1] Deian Stefan, Alejandro Russo, John C. Mitchell, and David Mazières. Flexible
dynamic information flow control in haskell. SIGPLAN Not., 46(12):95–106,
September 2011.
[2] Paul Hudak, Simon Peyton Jones, Philip Wadler, Brian Boutel, Jon Fairbairn,
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